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Abstract. The overestimation of willingness-to-pay (WTP) in hypothetical responses is
a well-known finding in the literature. Various techniques have been proposed to re-
move or, at least, reduce this bias. Using about 30,000 responses on WTP for a variety
of power mixes from a panel of 6,500 German households and the fixed-effects esti-
mator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, this article simultaneously explores the
effects of two common ex-ante approaches – cheap talk and consequential script – and
the ex-post certainty approach to calibrating hypothetical WTP responses. Based on a
switching regression model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of respondent
certainty, we find evidence for a lower WTP among those respondents who classi-
fy themselves as definitely certain about their answers. Although neither cheap talk
nor the consequential-script corrective reduce WTP estimates, receiving either of these
scripts increases the probability that respondents indicate definite certainty about their
WTP bids.
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1 Introduction
Inferences on willingness-to-pay (WTP) for non-market goods ideally rely on actual,
rather than hypothetical choices, that is, on revealed, rather than stated preferences.
Contrary to stated preferences, revealed preferences entail a real economic commit-
ment or consequence, such as signing a contract or the delivery of a commodity (HAR-
RISON, 2006:125). Frequently, however, revealed-preference information is unavailable.
One reason is due to the lack of markets or third-party financing (BLUMENSCHEIN et
al., 2008:114). Another reason for the absence of revealed preferences owes to market
interventions that distort price signals.
A deficit of information on revealed preferences prevails specifically for so-called
green electricity, that is, electricity solely produced from renewable energy technolo-
gies.1 This is due to the fact that contracts on the delivery of green electricity are often
cheaper than contracts on conventional electricity, although the cost for renewable elec-
tricity production is typically higher. In Germany, for instance, this contradiction exists
because for such contracts cheap green electricity, e. g. produced on the basis of compe-
titive water power, is frequently imported from abroad. This circumstance prevents re-
searchers from receiving comprehensive information on consumers’ true preferences,
which would only be revealed by engagements in contracts on green electricity that
reflect the actual cost.
In such a situation, estimating the WTP for green electricity necessarily rests on
methods for eliciting stated preferences that, ultimately, are based on hypothetical choi-
ces. One commonly employed stated-preference approach is the contingent-valuation
method (CVM), which has the advantage of being able to elicit passive use values,
that is, economic benefits that are not directly experienced by respondents. Applying
this approach appears to be particularly appropriate in the case of green electricity, as
the benefits of such policies aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions may be largely
1The electricity production based on renewable technologies can be regarded as a public good (see
e. g. MENGES et al. (2005:432)), as nobody can be excluded from the associated positive effects and there
is non-rivalry in the consumption of the benefits.
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determined by passive use values arising from bequests to future generations (WHITE-
HEAD, CHERRY, 2007:248).
There is ample empirical evidence, though, that hypothetical responses someti-
mes substantially overestimate WTP. This overestimation problem, referred to in the
literature as hypothetical bias, has been documented extensively (see e. g. BISHOP,
HEBERLEIN, 1979), including the laboratory experiments by CUMMINGS et al. (1995,
1997), who compare real and hypothetical WTP, as well as the meta-analysis by LIST
and GALLET (2001) and the reviews by HARRISON (2006) and HARRISON and RUT-
STRÖM (2008).
Various techniques have been proposed to remove or, at least, reduce this bias.
Three of the most prominent techniques are the consequential-script corrective sugge-
sted by BULTE et al. (2005:334), the cheap-talk protocol introduced by CUMMINGS and
TAYLOR (1999), and the certainty approach conceived by JOHANNESSON et al. (1998).
In one variant of the certainty approach, hypothetical WTP responses are divided into
two classes of certainty using a follow-up question: Subjects are asked whether they
are ‘fairly’ or ‘absolutely sure’ about their WTP responses, as was done by JOHANNES-
SON et al. (1998) in a early form of this approach. Subsequently, the certainty question
was adjusted by BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (1998), who only treated those hypothetical
responses about which respondents were ‘definitely sure’ as yes-responses, whereas
‘probably sure’ responses were treated the same as no-responses. According to BLU-
MENSCHEIN et al. (1998, 2001, 2008), this approach was effective in removing hypo-
thetical bias both in laboratory and field experiments.
While the certainty approach involves a follow-up question, the consequential
and cheap-talk correctives precede the elicitation of the WTP and present respondents
with scripts that are intended to encourage deeper reflection on the implications of
their responses. The consequential corrective, also called consequentialism, is based on
a script with which subjects are told that their responses to valuation questions will ha-
ve real consequences. The cheap-talk approach consists of a script including an explicit
discussion on the notion of hypothetical bias and its causes (see e. g. CARLSSON et al.,
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2005:149, WHITEHEAD and CHERRY, 2007:252), thereby asking respondents to adjust
for this bias in stating their WTP. In short, while cheap talk and consequential scripts
require that respondents read these scripts and adjust their preferences accordingly, the
certainty approach is less demanding in that participants just have to answer a single
question.
The evidence for the impact of both ex-ante approaches is inconclusive. Whi-
le CUMMINGS and TAYLOR (1999) find that the cheap-talk corrective reduces bias in
experimental referenda about donations to public goods and CARLSSON, FRYKBLOM,
and LAGERKVIST (2005:151) conclude that a cheap talk script can significantly decrease
the degree of inflated values in choice experiments, subsequent studies yield mixed re-
sults. In a second-price auction for sports cards, for example, LIST (2001) finds that this
approach removed the hypothetical bias for non-dealers, yet not for dealers. Moreo-
ver, the bias was not fully removed in a study by MURPHY et al. (2005) on a voluntary
contribution mechanism. In contrast, in field studies, BULTE et al. (2005) and LANDRY
and LIST (2007) provide support for the hypothesis that stated WTP values obtained
via cheap-talk and consequential treatments are lower than without inclusion of these
protocols. Investigating WTP for a hypothetical environmental improvement, HERRI-
GES et al. (2010) find evidence for a "knife-edge"result, that is, that WTP distributions
are equal among those respondents believing the survey to be consequential, but dif-
ferent among those believing that the survey is irrelevant for policy purposes.
The present study contributes to this strand of the literature by simultaneously
analyzing the effects of ex-ante and ex-post bias correctives in the estimation of WTP
for a variety of power mixes in Germany, a country that is currently in the midst of a
massive transformation of its power sector, exemplified by the legally stipulated nucle-
ar phase-out by 2022 and the commitment to increase the share of electricity produced
from renewable energy technologies from almost 25% in 2013 to 50% by 2030 and 80%
by 2050. A distinguishing feature of the analysis is that we draw on around 30,000
responses of a large panel of about 6,500 households, with which we provide for fixed-
effects estimates of the WTP for distinct power mixes comprising fossil fuels, nuclear
power, renewable energy, and combinations thereof, thereby controlling for unobser-
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ved heterogeneity.
Given the lack of market prices for specific power mixes, such as electricity solely
produced on the basis of nuclear power, it is not possible to calibrate hypothetical WTP
responses using real payments.2 Similar to many other open-ended contingent valua-
tion studies, such as BULTE et al. (2005), CARLSSON et al. (2005), and LUSK (2003), our
analysis is thus based on hypothetical data alone. Using an experimental design, our
aim is to gauge the extent to which the estimates of WTP vary according to two alterna-
tive ex-ante treatments in the form of cheap-talk and consequential scripts, which are
crossed with an ex-post certainty procedure that endogenously divides respondents
into two groups distinguished by their level of certainty.
To this end, we randomly divided the panel into three groups encompassing an
equal number of households: (1) a treatment group of households who received a
cheap-talk script before eliciting their WTP for five randomly selected electricity mi-
xes out of 14 mixes in total, (2) a second treatment group whose households received
a consequential script and (3) a control group without such treatments. Upon stating
their preferences, all households have been asked according to the certainty approach
in the version suggested by BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (1998) whether they are probably or
definitely sure about their WTP responses, yielding six subgroups altogether.
Based on a switching regression model that accounts for the potential endogenei-
ty of respondent certainty, we find evidence for a lower WTP among those respondents
who classify themselves as definitely certain about their answers, similar to findings
of BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (2008). Moreover, while neither the cheap-talk nor the con-
sequential script corrective reduces WTP estimates, receiving either of these scripts
increases the probability that respondents indicate definite certainty about their WTP
bids.
The subsequent section describes the survey design and the data set. Section 3
2The field experiment of ROSE et al. (2002), who employ a provision point mechanism, could be
regarded as an exemption. These authors’ results and program design, however, is not applicable to
countries with promotion schemes for green electricity, such as Germany.
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provides a description of the estimation method, followed by the presentation and
interpretation of the results given in Section 4. The last section summarizes and con-
cludes.
2 Data and Experimental Design
To elicit people’s WTP for a variety of power mixes, we collaborated with the survey
institute forsa, which maintains a panel of more than 10,000 households that is repre-
sentative of the German-speaking population.3 forsa collects data using a state-of-the-
art tool that allows panelists to fill out the questionnaire using either a television or, if
access is available, the internet. Respondents – in our survey the household heads – re-
trieve and return questionnaires from home and can interrupt and continue the survey
at any time.
A large set of socio-economic and demographic background information on all
household members is available from forsa’s household selection procedure and upda-
ted regularly. Within the survey period of May 10 to June 17, 2013, 6,522 households
completed the questionnaire. Given that 618 households did not complete the ques-
tionnaire, this corresponds to a response rate of about 91%, which is much higher than
the response rates resulting from the energy consumption surveys that forsa conducted
for us in the past (e. g. FRONDEL, VANCE, 2013).4 Information on those households that
have participated in the survey, but have not completed the questionnaire, is unavaila-
ble, as it is forsa’s declared principle to not offer this data. For our survey, though, this
is inconsequential, as this share of households is very small.
Along the lines of LANCASTER (1966), who emphasizes that people derive utility
from both the characteristics of goods and the consumption level, we assume that an
individual’s WTP for electricity specifically depends on the way it is produced. To elicit
3Information on the panel is available at http://www.forsa.com/.
4A summary of the descriptive results, as well as the questionnaire, both in German, can be retrieved
from the project page: www.rwi-essen.de/eval-map.
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this WTP, for comparison purposes we adopt the survey design used by GRÖSCHE and
SCHRÖDER (2011), who initiated a similar survey among the forsa household panel at
the outset of 2008, but did not investigate the effects of bias correctives.
The survey begins with a brief introductory text on electricity generation techno-
logies in general. Respondents are then presented with a sequence of five randomly
selected power mixes accompanied by the following text:5 “We request that you re-
port the maximum amount that you, personally, would be willing to pay. As a basis
for comparison, please consider an electricity mix comprised exclusively of the fos-
sil sources coal, natural gas, and oil, which has a price of e100 per month”. A more
detailed extract of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.
While several formats to elicit WTP have been suggested in the literature (see
Frew et al., 2003), such as the close-ended, payment scale, and bidding/bargaining for-
mats, the open-ended format used by GRÖSCHE and SCHRÖDER (2011) has the virtue
of providing a reference point while at the same time avoiding any binding restrictions
on WTP bids. Responses are instead allowed to vary in a very broad range between e0
and e9,999 in discrete increments of e1. A particular advantage of the open-ended
format is that, as opposed to the close-ended format, it yields exact WTP information
(CARLSSON et al. , 2011:791).
A potential drawback of the open-ended format is the possible occurrence of pro-
test bids, where respondents assign either a zero or an invalidly high value to the good
(HALSTEAD et al., 1992). Our empirical analysis indicates, however, that protest bids
are hardly present in our data base. For example, the share of zero bids, at 0.03%, is ne-
gligible, and the incidence of very high bids is also relatively low. In the case of 100%
green electricity, for which the mean bid is e112.6, only 0.5% of the sample reported a
bid greater than e200, with the highest bid being e1,111. The corresponding share of
zero bids is 0.8%. These outcomes provide for an indication that another point of skep-
5While there may be biases from ordering effects (see e. g. CARLSSON, MØRKBAK, OLSEN, 2012),
randomizing the draws of the alternatives should minimize such biases (BATEMAN and LANGFORD,
1997; CLARK and FRIESEN, 2008).
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ticism toward the open-ended format does not apply to our study: If this hypothetical
open-ended design had not been incentive-compatible, as is frequently criticized in the
literature, the share of zero bids should have been non-negligible, as perfectly rational
respondents with higher costs for an electricity mix than their WTP would state a zero
bid.
Before requesting the WTP bids for five out of a variety of 14 power mixes, pane-
lists are randomly divided into three equally large groups, with Group 2 and 3 being
either confronted with a cheap-talk or a consequential script, respectively, whereas
(control) Group 1 receives no such treatments. Both scripts, reported below, are mo-
dified versions of those provided in the literature in that they are short and rather
simple. More extensive cheap talk scripts emerging from the literature give examples,
while other consequentiality scripts describe specific ways in which the results will be
used by decision makers, features that are omitted in our set-up to lower the burden
on respondents.
Our cheap-talk script follows the version of CARLSSON et al. (2005:149), while our
consequential script has been mainly inspired by BULTE et al. (2005:334). Both scripts
are condensed as much as possible to avoid that panelists ignore the script simply
because of the time requirements for reading the text.
CHEAP TALK (READ ONLY BY GROUP 2):
In analyzing survey data, it is often found that some respondents report
a relatively high willingness to pay for environmental goods like clean air.
Presumably, these respondents don’t take into account that were they really
to pay such a large sum of money, they would have to forgo the purchase of
other goods. We therefore request that your answer to the following ques-
tions corresponds to the sum of money that you would in reality be willing
to pay.
CONSEQUENTIAL SCRIPT (READ ONLY BY GROUP 3):
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First, we would like to ask whether you believe that representative surveys
such as this one have an influence on policy-making. More concretely: do
you believe that the results of this survey will have an influence on poli-
tical decisions? (The response options are: yes, no, don’t know.) Irrespec-
tive of your answer to the above question, we would like you to assume
that this representative survey will have an influence on political decisions.
This means that your reported willingness to pay should correspond to the
amount of money that you are truly willing to spend.
Only upon stating their preferences on all of the five power mixes are the respon-
dents asked about the certainty of their response. For this purpose, we use the certainty
approach in the version suggested by BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (1998), which asks whe-
ther they are probably or definitely sure about their WTP responses. This yields six
subgroups altogether and a 3 × 2 split-sample survey design in which two treatments
and a control group are crossed with two certainty levels (Table 1).
Table 1: Experimental Design
Certainty on WTP
Definitely Probably
Sure: C = 1 Sure: C = 0 Total Shares
Group 1 (control group) 990 1,185 2,175 33.35%
Group 2 (cheap talk =1) 1,180 997 2,177 33.38%
Group 3 (consequential =1) 1,074 1,096 2,170 33.27%
Total 3,244 3,278 6,522 100.00%
Shares 49.74% 50.26% 100.00%
The share of respondents who are definitely sure about their WTP responses, described
by certainty variable C, amounts to 49.74%, implying that a slight majority of 50.26%
is just ‘probably sure’ (Tables 1 and 2). As elaborated in Section 3, we assume that
dummy variable C reflects an endogenous decision of the respondents, as opposed to
their exogenous confrontation with the treatments.
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The means of the dummy variables cheap talk and consequential, reported in Table
2, indicate that non-participation in the survey did not impact the uniform distribution
of the households across the two treatment groups and the control group (see also
Table 1): The shares of households who belong to the cheap-talk and consequential-
script groups amount to 33.4 and 33.3%, respectively.
Table 2: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Definition Mean
age Age of respondent 52.96
female Dummy: 1 if respondent is female 0.326
children Dummy: 1 if respondent has children 0.208
cheap talk Dummy: 1 if household received
a cheap-talk script 0.334
consequential Dummy: 1 if household received a
consequential script 0.333
C Dummy: 1 if household ticked the option
’definitely sure’ for the certainty question 0.497
degree Dummy: 1 if household head has a
college preparatory degree 0.399
low income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
is lower than e1,251 0.189
medium income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
is between e1,251 and e2,750 0.452
high income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
is between e2,751 and e4,250 0.253
very high income Dummy: 1 if net monthly household income
exceeds e4,250 0.106
1-person hh Dummy: 1 if # household members = 1 0.276
2-person hh Dummy: 1 if # household members = 2 0.435
3-person hh Dummy: 1 if # household members = 3 0.151
4-person hh Dummy: 1 if # household members = 4 0.100
> 4-person hh Dummy: 1 if # household members > 4 0.038
P Dummy: 1 respondent has correctly indicated the
broad range of average electricity prices 0.183
L Dummy: 1 respondent has correctly indicated the
broad range of the levy for renewables 0.306
Also of note is the fact that with a share of about one third, female respondents
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are a minority. This is due to our decision to deliberately ask only household heads to
participate in the survey, as, by definition, they typically make investment decisions
and check invoices, such as electricity bills.
3 Methodology
To cope with the endogeneity of certainty variable C, we apply a switching regressi-
on model with endogenous switching (see MADDALA 1983:223-228). The behavior of
households is described by two regression equations that divide observations into two
regimes, those who are certain about their WTP (Regime 1) and those who are uncer-
tain (Regime 0):
WTP1i = βT1 · x1i + u1i, if Ci = 1 (Regime 1), (1)
WTP0i = βT0 · x0i + u0i, if Ci = 0 (Regime 0). (2)
In this equation system, WTP1i and WTP0i denote the households’ individual WTP
bids and x1i and x0i include their determinants, such as net household income, while
β1 and β0 are vectors of the associated parameters to be estimated.
C is a dummy variable indicating the certainty regime:
Ci = 1 if γT · zi ≥ ui,
Ci = 0 otherwise,
(3)
where zi includes factors, such as a good guess of electricity prices, Pi, and of the levy
for subsidizing renewables, Li, that may affect whether a household head i is either
definitely sure about her WTP bids (Regime 1: Ci = 1) or just probably sure: (Regime
0: Ci = 0).
Since such guesses have been asked during the survey, in a first stage the un-
known parameter vector γ can be estimated – up to a scale factor – using standard
probit maximum likelihood methods, where, due to the indeterminacy of the scale fac-
tor, Var(ui) = 1 can be assumed. In the endogenous switching regression model, the
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error term ui is assumed to be correlated with both errors u1i and u2i, as there may
be unobservable factors that are relevant for both the selection into either regime and
WTP bids.6
The second stage equations to be estimated are
WTP1i = βT1 · x1i − σ1u · IVM1i + ε1i, for Ii = 1, (4)
WTP0i = βT0 · x0i + σ0u · IVM0i + ε0i, for Ii = 0, (5)
where ε1i and ε0i are new residuals with zero conditional mean and
IVM1i :=
φ(γT · zi)
Φ(γT · zi) , IVM0i :=
φ(γT · zi)
1−Φ(γT · zi) (6)
represent the two variants of the inverse Mills ratios, with φ(.) and Φ(.) denoting the
density and cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respec-
tively. When appended as extra regressors in the second-stage estimation, the inverse
Mills ratios are controls for potential biases arising from sample selectivity: It is like-
ly that intrinsically unobservable characteristics, such as carelessness about electricity
bills, also affect WTP bids. If the estimated coefficients – σ1u and σ0u – are statistically
significant, this is an indication of sample selectivity. For the second-stage estimation,
we insert the predicted values ÎVM1i and ÎVM0i using the probit estimates γ̂ of the
first-stage estimation. Given that the variance of the residuals is heteroscedastic in na-
ture (see MADDALA 1983:225), equations (4) and (5) should be estimated by weighted
least squares using the Huber-White estimates of variance.
Identification of the model requires the specification of at least one variable that
determines the discrete first-stage outcome, but not the continuous WTP response re-
levant for second-stage regression. We specify two such exclusion restrictions, both of
which are based on the respondent’s familiarity with electricity provision. The first
6All three terms are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution, with mean vector zero and
covariance matrix
Σ =

σ21 σ10 σ1u
. σ20 σ0u
. . 1
 .
11
is a dummy indicating whether the respondent correctly states the per-kWh price of
electricity within an error margin of 3 cents, while the second is a dummy indicating
whether the respondent correctly states the levy paid for renewable energy, within an
error margin of 1 cent per kWh. By law, this levy, which at the time of the survey was
5.3 cents per kWh, is included on every electricity bill. In 2013, the levy comprised
roughly 19% of the average per-kWh price of electricity of 28.5 cents.
A final methodological note concerns the panel structure of our data. The fact that
respondents report up to five WTP bids for five out of 14 different electricity mixes af-
fords an opportunity to estimate the associated parameters using fixed-effects panel
estimation methods. Employing the common least-squares dummy variable (LSDV)
approach, however, would not serve to identify the coefficients of the respondent attri-
butes, as these do not vary over responses and hence would drop out of the estimati-
on. We consequently apply an estimation method suggested by FRONDEL and VANCE
(2010) that is based on the within-group estimator. It involves producing fixed-effects
estimates by way of demeaning the respondent-varying variables mixit and using Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS):
WTPit = α0 + (αmix)T · [mixit −mixi] + αTzi + ξi + νit, (7)
where ξi represents an unknown individual-specific effect, νit is a random component
that varies over individuals and time and mixit denotes a vector of 14 dummy varia-
bles indicating the concrete power mixes shown to respondent i at time t, αmix are the
related parameters, and bars denote means over the five responses of respondent i. In
contrast to the LSDV approach, both sets of regressors, ∆it := mixit −mixi and zi, can
be included simultaneously in specification (7), an advantage that becomes relevant
when interaction terms involving variables from both sets are employed.
4 Empirical Results
The political economy of electricity provision in Germany has been strongly influenced
by two factors in recent years, both of which is reflected by the WTP figures for the
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alternative power mixes. The first factor is the country’s ongoing commitment to in-
crease the share of renewable energies, with green electricity production amounting
to a share of nearly 30% of gross consumption by the end of 2014. The second is the
nuclear catastrophe at Japan’s Fukushima in 2011, which had a profound impact in ex-
acerbating a longstanding skepticism in Germany on the merits of nuclear power and
led to the legal stipulation of its phase-out in the same year. These factors should be
borne in mind when interpreting the descriptive statistics for the WTP for the variety
of electricity mixes presented in Table 3. Recalling that the base category is 100% fossil
fuels with a cost of electricity consumption normalized toe100, the highest mean WTP
in the left panel of Table 3 has a value of 112.6 and a median of 110, corresponding to
100% renewables. Conversely, the lowest WTP, at a mean of 54.6 and a median of 60, is
seen for 100% nuclear power.
It is of interest to compare our figures for the year 2013 with those obtained by
GRÖSCHE and SCHRÖDER (2011) from the 2008 survey, presented in the right panel
of Table 3. While the WTP for most mixes encompassing nuclear power has changed
substantially, the WTP for renewables has remained relatively constant. Specifically,
with e110 and e112.6, respectively, both the median and mean WTP for 100% green
electricity have virtually remained the same. In contrast, with two exceptions in which
the median WTP remain unchanged, all other median values for those mixes with a
non-vanishing share of nuclear power are lower than those reported by GRÖSCHE and
SCHRÖDER (2011).7 It seems reasonable to conclude that the Fukushima catastrophe
influenced these outcomes of shrinking sympathies for nuclear power.
With respect to the effects of correctives, a preliminary comparison based on the
mean WTP for electricity stemming from 100% renewables indicates hardly any sta-
tistically significant differences at conventional significance levels (Table 4).8 For in-
7The comparison undertaken in Table 3 is in nominal terms, but the conclusions hold if we account
for the moderate inflation that prevailed since the survey analyzed by GRÖSCHE and SCHRÖDER (2011).
Specifically, when comparing real values, the difference in WTP for the 100% renewable mix is not stati-
stically significant. By contrast, we find significantly lower WTP for mixes comprising 75% nuclear.
8There is one exception: Among those who are less certain on their WTP bids, the mean WTP of
respondents who received a cheap-talk script is lower at a 1% significance level than for the control
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stance, while most of the t statistics are not reported, the t statistics shown in the last
column of Table 4 reveal that there are no significant discrepancies across those who
are definitely certain about their WTP and those who are not.
Table 3: WTP for a Variety of Electricity Mixes Relative to Electricity Production based
on 100% Fossil Fuels and Comparison with the Results of GRÖSCHE and SCHRÖDER
(2011).9
Our Study GRÖSCHE, SCHRÖDER (2011)
Shares in Electricity Mix Relative WTP 2013 Relative WTP 2008
Fossil Renew- Nuclear # of Std. # of Std.
Fuels ables Power Obs. Median Mean Dev. Obs. Median Mean Dev.
75% 25% 0% 2,184 100.0 96.2 60.1 1,008 100 97 29.7
50% 50% 0% 2,168 100.0 105.0 112.7 1,056 100 101 30.8
25% 75% 0% 2,099 100.0 103.3 232.0 1,031 102 106 32.9
0% 100% 0% 2,151 110.0 112.6 41.5 1,084 110 112 37.2
75% 0% 25% 2,112 80.0 84.6 190.1 1,063 85 85 30.4
50% 0% 50% 2,138 75.0 72.7 93.0 1,054 80 81 30.3
25% 0% 75% 2,171 70.0 66.6 81.8 951 80 76 33.4
0% 0% 100% 2,149 60.0 54.6 47.2 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
0% 25% 75% 2,143 75.0 81.9 272.1 1,088 80 81 33.8
0% 50% 50% 2,131 90.0 91.9 223.1 1,055 100 92 30.6
0% 75% 25% 2,173 100.0 95.6 55.2 1,058 100 99 34.6
50% 25% 25% 2,205 95.0 91.2 180.6 1,090 100 91 29.5
25% 50% 25% 2,145 100.0 95.4 138.3 1,048 100 96 29.5
25% 25% 50% 2,239 80.0 82.5 177.5 1,061 90 87 32.0
100% 0% 0% 6,522 100.0 100.0 0.0 2,948 100 100 0.0
Were all six subgroups to be selected perfectly randomly and, hence, were ba-
lanced with respect to both observable and unobservable factors, we would conclude
that the correctives have muted effects. However, the subgroup of definitely certain
individuals is not exogenously determined. Therefore, in what follows, multivariate
group.
9As not all respondents have provided us with five WTP bids, we end up with an unbalanced panel
of 30,208 observations with about 2,150 responses for each alternative (see Table 3) and, on average, 4.6
instead of 5 bids.
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methods described in the previous section are employed that treat the certainty outco-
me as a choice variable.
Table 4: Mean WTP for 100% Renewables across Treatments
Certainty on WTP Tests on
Definitely Probably Differences
Sure: C = 1 Sure: C = 0 t-Statistics
Group 1 (control group) 113.4 (36.7) 115.5 (39.0) 0.76
Group 2 (cheap talk =1) 111.0 (34.8) 108.0 (33.8) -1.09
Group 3 (consequential =1) 116.3 (62.2) 110.3 (30.1) -1.58
Total 113.6 (46.4) 111.5 (34.7) -1.17
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Exploiting the panel structure of our data base, we first estimate a fixed-effects
model that combines all observations, irrespective of the certainty outcome, thereby
providing for a comparison with the results obtained from the switching regression
model (Table 5). Not surprisingly, the signs on all of the dummies for the various power
mixes are negative, indicating that the base option of 100% renewable electricity com-
mands the highest WTP. Consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3,
the strongest negative effect is seen for 100% nuclear power. With a coefficient of -63.2,
the WTP for this option is about e63 lower than for electricity produced from 100%
renewables. For the remaining options that include nuclear power as part of the mix,
average WTPs are also lower than for those mixes that exclude nuclear power.
Another notable finding is the absence of an effect of either the cheap talk or
consequential treatments: With the exception of the coefficient on the consequential
script in the model with the definitely certain respondents, respective F tests on the
joint significance of the coefficient of a corrective and that of its interaction term with
100% renewable electricity presented in the final rows of Table 5 indicate no effect of
either corrective. Moreover, as can be seen from Table 5, the interaction terms of both
correctives with 100% renewable electricity are also statistically insignificant.
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Table 5: Fixed-Effects and Switching Regression Results.
Fixed Effects 2. Stage of Switching Regression Tests on
Total Sample Sub-sample Ci = 1 Sub-sample Ci = 0 Differences
Std. Std. Std. χ2
Variable Coeff.s Errors Coeff.s Errors Coeff.s Errors Statistics
∆ 75%fos25%ren ∗∗-20.4 (3.01) ∗∗-25.2 (5.01) ∗∗-16.0 (3.13) 2.43
∆ 50%fos50%ren ∗∗-11.8 (2.23) ∗∗-15.5 (2.89) ∗ -8.52 (3.31) 2.54
∆ 25%fos75%ren ∗ -13.0 (5.89) ∗∗-25.3 (3.80) 0.58 (12.0) ∗ 4.26
∆ 75%fos25%nuc ∗∗-35.6 (4.14) ∗∗-36.1 (7.16) ∗∗-35.9 (3.97) 0.00
∆ 50%fos50%nuc ∗∗-41.6 (2.65) ∗∗-46.9 (2.57) ∗∗-36.4 (4.73) ∗ 3.79
∆ 25%fos75%nuc ∗∗-50.4 (2.33) ∗∗-52.9 (2.98) ∗∗-48.3 (3.67) 0.96
∆ 100%nuc ∗∗-63.2 (3.17) ∗∗-65.3 (3.98) ∗∗-61.8 (5.10) 0.30
∆ 25%ren75%nuc ∗∗-35.5 (5.95) ∗∗-33.7 (10.5) ∗∗-38.3 (4.66) 0.16
∆ 50%ren50%nuc ∗∗-31.3 (2.75) ∗∗-34.7 (4.23) ∗∗-28.3 (3.56) 1.36
∆ 75%ren25%nuc ∗∗-18.2 (2.13) ∗∗-24.5 (2.44) ∗∗-11.8 (3.56) ∗∗ 8.67
∆ 50%fos25%ren25%nuc ∗∗-23.5 (4.86) ∗∗-31.7 (2.42) -14.9 (9.91) 2.73
∆ 25%fos50%ren25%nuc ∗∗-20.2 (3.23) ∗∗-21.7 (4.92) ∗∗-19.3 (4.06) 0.14
∆ 25%fos25%ren50%nuc ∗∗-36.5 (2.53) ∗∗-40.4 (2.58) ∗∗-33.1 (4.54) 1.95
cheap talk 4.19 (2.73) 4.03 (2.43) 13.5 (7.79) 1.36
cheap talk ×∆ 100%ren -4.61 (4.69) -4.53 (3.17) -8.92 (10.0) 0.37
consequential ∗ 5.93 (2.71) ∗ 7.78 (3.20) 8.96 (5.02) 0.05
consequential ×∆ 100%ren 0.91 (2.32) -4.33 (3.12) 1.94 (3.34) 1.88
female ∗∗-6.82 (1.87) -4.63 (3.25) ∗∗-22.8 (7.94) ∗ 4.51
age -0.11 (0.08) -0.07 (0.05) -0.16 (0.14) 0.49
degree 0.80 (2.00) 2.01 (2.02) 1.32 (3.67) 0.03
children -2.61 (4.62) -3.80 (2.19) 1.89 (10.9) 0.26
medium income ∗ 5.62 (2.20) 3.54 (3.18) ∗∗ 9.60 (3.33) 1.75
high income ∗∗ 11.6 (3.73) 9.33 (5.14) ∗∗ 20.2 (5.8) 1.95
very high income ∗∗ 19.9 (7.56) ∗ 14.6 (5.79) ∗ 43.6 (20.6) 1.85
IVM1 – – -0.62 (15.5) – – –
IVM2 – – – – ∗-54.0 (21.8) –
const. ∗∗91.9 (4.42) ∗∗ 89.4 (12.5) ∗∗138.6 (18.0) ∗ 5.03
Number of Obs. 24,906 13,310 11,596
F Tests Cheap talk F(2; 5,145)=1.16 F(2; 2,697)=1.48 F(2; 2,447)=1.52
F Tests Consequential F(2; 5,145)=2.41 F(2; 2,697)=3.14∗ F(2; 2,447)=1.64
Note: Coefficient estimates for household sizes are not statistically significant and have been omitted from the table for brevity.
∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Turning next to the estimates of the switching regression model and beginning
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with the first-stage probit estimates reported in Table 6, several variables have plau-
sible and statistically significant effects on an individual’s certainty about WTP bids.
Most notably, the identifying variable indicating knowledge of the broad range of the
levy for renewables, denoted by L, has a positive impact, as do membership in either
of the treatment groups indicated by cheap talk or consequential. Conversely, female has
a negative association. Likewise, relative to the base category of low-income house-
holds, the coefficients of all the income categories are uniformly negative, indicating
that more wealthy households are less likely to be sure about their WTP responses.
Finally, age has a non-linear effect that takes the form of an inverted U-curve, peaking
at an age of about 49.
Table 6: First-Stage Probit Estimation Results.
Probit Estimation Marginal Effects
Std. Std.
Variable Coeff.s Errors Effects Errors
female ∗∗ -0.350 (0.039) ∗∗ -0.135 (0.015)
age ∗∗ 0.056 (0.009) ∗∗ -0.002 (0.001)
age × age ∗∗-5.6 ·10−4 (9.0 ·10−5) – –
cheap talk ∗∗ 0.235 (0.043) ∗∗ 0.090 (0.016)
consequential ∗∗ 0.126 (0.043) ∗∗ 0.048 (0.016)
degree ∗ 0.092 (0.039) ∗ 0.035 (0.015)
children 0.029 (0.066) 0.011 (0.025)
medium income 0.022 (0.052) 0.008 (0.020)
high income 0.091 (0.062) 0.035 (0.024)
very high income ∗∗ 0.291 (0.077) ∗∗ 0.111 (0.029)
2-person hh ∗ -0.105 (0.047) ∗ -0.040 (0.018)
3-person hh -0.045 (0.069) -0.017 (0.026)
4-person hh -0.118 (0.086) -0.045 (0.033)
> 4-person hh -0.043 (0.115) -0.017 (0.044)
P 0.083 (0.046) 0.032 (0.017)
L ∗∗ 0.229 (0.039) ∗∗ 0.088 (0.015)
const. ∗∗ -1.364 (0.230) – –
Number of Obs. 5,283
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
With regard to the second-stage switching regression outcomes on WTP presen-
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ted in the final columns of Table 5, several outcomes bear highlighting. First, the WTP
for many electricity mixes is lower among respondents who are definitely certain about
their bid (Regime 1: Ci = 1), with statistically significant differences obtained for sever-
al electricity mixes, such as that including 75% renewables and 25% nuclear. Likewise,
comparing the constant terms across the two regimes reveals that the WTP for 100% re-
newables among definitely certain respondents who have not received any treatment
is, on average, about e49.2 lower than those not reporting definite certainty (Regime
0: Ci = 0), a difference that is statistically significant. (More precisely, this difference
holds for male respondents without children and without a college preparatory degree
who belong to the lowest income group.)
In contrast, as in the case of the reference model, the interaction terms of both
consequential treatment and cheap talk with the case of 100% renewables are not sta-
tistically significant, indicating that these treatments do not reduce the WTP for elec-
tricity that is exclusively produced on the basis of renewable technologies. We abstain
from reporting the results for further interaction terms of these treatments with other
electricity mixes because, without exception, coefficient estimates of such interaction
terms turned out to be statistically insignificant, both individually and jointly.
For the sub-sample of the definitely certain respondents, the estimate of the co-
efficient for the consequentialism dummy is positive and statistically significant, in-
dicating higher WTP bids for those who received a consequential script. While this
outcome appears to be at odds with both the theoretical concept of consequentialism
and the empirical results received from the literature, it may be explained by the spe-
cific formulation of our consequential script, which urges the respondents to assume
that this survey has an influence on political decisions (see Appendix A). Taking this
assumption seriously, it may well be the case that respondents exaggerate their bids, at
least for electricity mixes with substantial shares of renewables, for which the majority
of respondents have strong sympathies.10 Exaggerating WTP bids might be an attempt
to influence policy by signalling support (WHITEHEAD, CHERRY, 2007:249). With re-
10About 85% of our respondents would agree to the statement that the electricity production from
renewable energy technologies should be supported (ANDOR, FRONDEL, VANCE, 2014:1).
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spect to the positive sign of the coefficient for the consequentialism dummy, it bears
noting, however, that in our study there are no comparisons to actual amounts paid,
that hypothetical bias is not necessarily present in all studies, and that this bias is not
always positive.
Four further discrepancies become evident between the two certainty regimes:
First, the coefficient of the female dummy is statistically significant only for Regime 0
and over three times the magnitude of the comparison model, indicating substantially
lower WTP among less certain females.11 Second, of the remaining personal attribu-
tes, the dummies indicating the income categories are positive throughout for Regime
0 and statistically significant, whereas for Regime 1 only the dummy variable corre-
sponding to households with very high incomes is statistically positive, suggesting
that wealthy households are prepared to pay more for electricity irrespective of its
kind of production. Third, the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is negative and sta-
tistically significant only for sub-sample Ci = 0, suggesting that unobservables that
increase the likelihood of membership in this regime have a negative effect on WTP.
Finally, in line with WATSON and RYAN (2007) and BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (2008), our
findings suggest that in the sub-sample of definitely sure respondents there are fewer
anomalies than in the sub-sample of probably sure respondents.
To glean further insight into the implications of endogenous switching for the pa-
rameter estimates, we also estimated two models that exclude the inverse Mills ratio
(see Table B1 in Appendix B). Overall, the differences in the coefficient estimates bet-
ween the two regimes is less stark when not controlling for sample selectivity. Most
notably, the WTP estimates for the case of 100% renewable energy, captured by the
constant terms, are statistically indistinguishable, indicating that the application of the
switching regression model identifies differences between definitely and probably cer-
tain respondents that would otherwise be obscured when not controlling for the endo-
geneity of certainty status.
11Interestingly, among those who are definitely sure, the WTP for females and males are statistically
indistinguishable (Table 5), whereas the probability of being definitely sure is statistically significantly
lower for females (Table 6).
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5 Summary and Conclusion
Various techniques, such as the consequential- and cheap-talk script, as well as the cer-
tainty approach, have been proposed in the literature to mitigate the well-known bias
in hypothetical responses to questions on the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for non-market
goods such as environmental amenities. Using an experimental design and empirical
data from a recent survey among about 6,500 German households on the WTP for a
variety of 14 kinds of electricity mixes, we have provided further evidence on the ef-
fectiveness of these three approaches to calibrating hypothetical WTP responses. Em-
ploying an endogenous switching regression model to account for the endogeneity of
respondent certainty, we have applied the certainty approach on continuous WTP bids,
whereas elsewhere it has been used only for dichotomous choice questions, e. g. by
BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (2008).
Our results suggest that neither cheap talk nor the consequential script immedia-
tely reduce the WTP estimates, but both treatments are found to have an indirect effect
by increasing the probability that respondents are definitely certain about their WTP
bids. In fact, when controlling for selectivity bias with a switching regression model,
we uncover differences in WTP according to respondent certainty, with the definitely
certain respondents reporting lower values for several kinds of electricity mixes, most
notably the 100% renewable mix. This raises the question of how to treat the WTP
estimates derived from the two groups.
BLUMENSCHEIN et al. (2008) discard the values obtained from the uncertain re-
spondents, persuasively arguing that an unsure response is tantamount to a no-answer
to a dichotomous choice question, as those who are uncertain about a purchase of a
good are unlikely to actually spend money even when they state a tentative willing-
ness to do so. When following this approach also in cases in which respondents indi-
cate their WTP on a continuous scale, as in the present study, policy recommendations
that take heed of the, on average, lower WTP of those who are definitely certain about
their responses would seem warranted. To this end, the switching regression provides
a useful methodology for controlling for selectivity biases as related to the certain-
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ty of the respondents. Finally, due to the fact that the ex-ante approaches increase the
probability of the respondents to state certain WTP values, our results support the sug-
gestion by WHITEHEAD and CHERRY (2007) that the ex-ante and ex-post approaches
can be seen as complementary.
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Appendix A: Extract of Questionnaire
The elicitation of the WTP for specific electricity mixes began with a brief introducti-
on on the diversity of production technologies, followed by a short description of the
survey design, including several practical examples. Upon displaying the introducto-
ry text, both the cheap-talk and consequential scripts were presented to the respective
treatment groups before posing the question on WTP, yet not to the control group. The
translations of these texts and scripts into English is reported below:
“Electricity can be produced with different energy sources and technologies. Among
these are coal- or natural gas fired power plants, nuclear power, or renewable ener-
gy technologies such as photovoltaics, hydropower, and wind turbines. A household
might obtain electricity that is produced from a single source such as a fossil fuel, or
it might alternatively obtain electricity that is produced from some mix of different
sources such as fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energies.
We will now present you with different electricity offers that are distinguished
solely by the proportions of fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and renewable energy with
which the electricity is produced. For each of these offers, we request that you report
the maximum amount that you, personally, would be willing to pay. As a basis for
comparison, please consider an energy mix comprised exclusively of the fossil sources
coal, natural gas, and oil, which has a price of e100 per month.
Example: The price for the comparison offer is e100. If the price you would be
willing to pay for the alternative offer were e70, please record the amount e70. If the
price you would be willing to pay for the alternative offer were instead e180, please
record the amount e180. Of course, any other values may also be recorded.
Now we would like to ask you about how much you would be willing to pay for
different energy sources and energy technologies. In what follows, we will refer to this
as your ‘willingness to pay’.”
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Appendix B: Table
Table B1: Fixed-Effects Results without Switching Regression Correction.
Sub-sample Ci = 1 Sub-sample Ci = 0 Test on Differences
Std. Std. χ2
Variable Coeff.s Errors Coeff.s Errors Statistics
∆ 75%fos25%ren ∗∗-25.2 (5.01) ∗∗-15.7 (3.13) 2.57
∆ 50%fos50%ren ∗∗-15.5 (2.89) ∗ -8.22 (3.33) 2.72
∆ 25%fos75%ren ∗∗-25.4 (3.80) 0.83 (12.0) ∗ 4.33
∆ 75%fos25%nuc ∗∗-36.1 (7.15) ∗∗-35.6 (3.92) 0.00
∆ 50%fos50%nuc ∗∗-46.9 (2.57) ∗∗-36.2 (4.77) ∗ 3.93
∆ 25%fos75%nuc ∗∗-52.9 (2.98) ∗∗-48.1 (3.68) 1.07
∆ 100%nuc ∗∗-65.3 (3.99) ∗∗-61.6 (5.09) 0.34
∆ 25%ren75%nuc ∗∗-33.7 (10.5) ∗∗-38.0 (4.74) 0.14
∆ 50%ren50%nuc ∗∗-34.7 (4.23) ∗∗-27.9 (3.54) 1.50
∆ 75%ren25%nuc ∗∗-24.5 (2.44) ∗∗-11.6 (3.59) 8.96
∆ 50%fos25%ren25%nuc ∗∗-31.7 (2.42) -14.6 (9.97) 2.78
∆ 25%fos50%ren25%nuc ∗∗-21.7 (4.92) ∗∗-19.1 (4.07) 0.17
∆ 25%fos25%ren50%nuc ∗∗-40.4 (2.58) ∗∗-33.1 (4.57) 2.10
female ∗4.76 (2.41) ∗∗-10.4 (3.42) 1.83
age -0.09 (0.05) -0.17 (0.14) 0.28
cheap talk 4.07 (2.62) 5.48 (5.51) 0.05
cheap talk ×∆ 100%ren -2.53 (3.16) -8.47 (10.0) 0.32
consequential ∗ 7.71 (3.88) 4.49 (3.70) 0.36
consequential ×∆ 100%ren -4.34 (3.12) 2.22 (3.36) 2.05
degree 1.99 (2.41) 0.33 (3.41) 0.31
children -3.77 (2.12) 0.76 (10.3) 0.09
medium income 3.53 (3.21) ∗ 7.71 (3.01) 0.90
high income 9.41 (5.59) ∗∗ 14.6 (4.99) 0.47
very high income 14.7 (8.11) 29.8 (15.9) 0.71
const. ∗∗ 88.9 (4.00) ∗∗ 95.6 (7.6) 0.61
Number of Obs. 13,310 11,596
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
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